Measuring the Financial Sophistication of Households by Campbell, John et al.
 
Measuring the Financial Sophistication of Households
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Calvet, Laurent E., John Y. Campbell, and Paolo Sodini.
Forthcoming. Measuring the financial sophistication of
households. Papers and proceedings. Special Issue, American
Economic Review.
Published Version http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/index.php
Accessed February 17, 2015 2:29:46 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:2618438
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAAMeasuring the Financial Sophistication of Households
By LAURENT E. CALVET,J OHN Y. CAMPBELL, AND PAOLO SODINI 
Many households invest in ways that are hard
to reconcile with standard ﬁnancial theory and that
have been labelled as investment mistakes (Camp-
bell, 2006; Calvet, Campbell and Sodini, hence-
forth “CCS”, 2007). There is increasing inter-
est among household ﬁnance researchers in the con-
cept of ﬁnancial sophistication, deﬁned as the abil-
ity of a household to avoid making such mistakes.
A growing empirical literature documents a cross-
sectional correlation between household characteris-
tics and investment mistakes. Richer, better educated
households tend to be better diversiﬁed (Blume and
Friend, 1975; CCS, 2007; Goetzmann and Kumar,
2008; Vissing-Jorgensen, 2003), display less inertia
(Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sundén, 2003; Bilias, Geor-
garakos and Haliassos, 2008; Campbell, 2006; CCS,
2009; Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002), and have a weaker
disposition to hold losing and sell winning stocks
(CCS, 2009; Dhar and Zhu, 2006) than other house-
holds. One feature of these earlier papers is that mis-
takes are investigated one at a time, often on a non-
representative sample of households.
In this paper, we jointly analyze several investment
mistakes in a comprehensive, high-quality panel of
household ﬁnances. Because Swedish residents pay
taxes on both income and wealth, Statistics Sweden
has a parliamentary mandate to collect highly detailed
information on the ﬁnances of every household in the
country. We compiled the data supplied by Statistics
Sweden into a panel of the entire population (about
  Calvet: Department of Finance, HEC Paris, 1 av-
enue de la Libération, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France; and
NBER, calvet@hec.fr. Campbell: Department of Eco-
nomics, Littauer Center, Harvard University, Cambridge,
MA 02138, USA, and NBER, john_campbell@harvard.edu.
Sodini: Department of Finance, Stockholm School of Eco-
nomics, Sveavägen 65, Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm,
Sweden, Paolo.Sodini@hhs.se. We thank Statistics Sweden
for providing the data. This material is based upon work
supported by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche under a
Chaire d’Excellence to Calvet, BFI under a Research Grant
to Sodini, the HEC Foundation, the National Science Foun-
dationunderGrantNo. 0214061toCampbell, Riksbank,and
the Wallander and Hedelius Foundation.
4.8 million households) covering four years (1999-
2002). We observe detailed demographic and income
information, and, most notably, the worldwide assets
owned by each resident on December 31 of each year,
including bank accounts, mutual funds and stocks.
The information is provided for each individual ac-
count or each security referenced by its International
Security Identiﬁcation Number (ISIN). We refer the
reader to CCS (2007, 2009) for a detailed presenta-
tion of this dataset.
We use the Swedish panel to simultaneously in-
vestigate three types of investment mistakes: under-
diversiﬁcation, inertia in risk taking, and the dispo-
sition effect in direct stockholdings. Consistent with
earlier research, ﬁnancial wealth, family size and ed-
ucation are found to have a negative impact on the
level of all three mistakes. These ﬁndings motivate
the construction of an index of ﬁnancial sophistica-
tion, which is obtained by regressing the negative of
the mistake vector on a single combination of house-
hold characteristics. The index ofﬁnancial sophistica-
tion increases strongly with log ﬁnancial wealth and
household size, and to a lesser extent with education
and proxies for ﬁnancial experience. We brieﬂy dis-
cuss how sophistication can be estimated in less de-
tailed datasets. An Appendix available online further
presents the dataset and the estimation methodology.
I. Measuring Investment Mistakes
A. Deﬁnitions
Following CCS (2007, 2009), we consider three
classes ofliquidﬁnancial assets, excluding illiquid as-
sets from consideration. Cash consists of bank ac-
count balances and money market funds. Mutual
funds refer to all other funds. Stocks refer to direct
holdings only. We measure a household’s ﬁnancial
wealthasthesumofitsholdingsintheseassetclasses.
This deﬁnition focuses on gross wealth and does not
subtract mortgage or other household debt.
We deﬁne the following variables for each house-
hold h. The risky portfoliocontains stocks and mutual
funds butexcludes cash. Theriskyshare h t at datet
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is the weight of the risky portfolio in ﬁnancial wealth.
B. Investment Mistakes
For every household h, we denote by yh t  
 yh t 1  yh t 2  yh t 3   a vector of investment mis-
takes at date t. The ﬁrst component yh t 1 measures
underdiversiﬁcation, the second component yh t 2
risky share inertia, and the third component yh t 3 the
disposition effect. The deﬁnition of these variables is
now explained.
Since Sweden is a small and open economy, we
assess the diversiﬁcation of household portfolios rel-
ative to a global equity portfolio, the MSCI World
Index. As in CCS (2007), we assume that assets
are priced on world markets in an international cur-
rency according to a global version of the CAPM.
>From the perspective of a Swedish investor, the pric-
ing model induces a domestic CAPM in which the
currency-hedged world index is mean-variance efﬁ-
cient. Because currency-hedging is typically unavail-
able to most retail investors, except perhaps the rich-
est, we view the unhedged version of the index as a
more attainable benchmark. We therefore measure
underdiversiﬁcation in household h’s risky portfolio
by the relative Sharpe ratio loss
yh t 1   1  
Sh t
Sm
 
where Sh t and Sm respectively denote the Sharpe ra-
tio of the risky portfolio and unhedged index under
the CAPM.
In CCS (2009) we have developed a structural
model of portfolio rebalancing, in which inertia can
be measured by the instrument variable regression of
risky share changes on household characteristics. We
now construct a proxy that can be readily computed
from individual household data. A useful starting
point is provided by the absolute value of risky share
changes,   h t 1    h t   which Annette Vissing-
Jorgensen (2002) uses as a measure of inertia. We
have found in CCS (2009) that boundary effects are
typically more pronounced in levels than in logs. For
this reason, we proxy inertia by:
yh t 2   ln  h t    ln  h t 1   
that is by the absolute value of risky share changes in
logs
As in Odean (1998) and Dhar and Zhu (2006), our
analysis of the disposition effect builds on the propor-
tion of stock gains realized during the year, PGRh t 
and the proportion of stock losses realized, PLRh t.
A gain in a particular stock is counted as being real-
ized if the investor sells some (but not necessarily all)
of its holdings of the stock. The household’s propor-
tion of gains realized, PGRh t  is then deﬁned as the
number of winning stocks with realized gains divided
by the total number of winning stocks. PLRh t is de-
ﬁned analogously. The disposition effect in direct
stockholdings is then measured by the difference:
yh t 3   PGRh t   PLRh t 
We depart in two ways from Odean (1998) and
Dhar and Zhu (2006). First, because the purchase
price is unavailable in our dataset, we classify a stock
as a winner if it has a higher return than the unhedged
world index during the year, and as a loser if it under-
performs the index.
Second, the earlier literature focuses on the set
of households that have experienced both gains and
losses in their stock portfolios. We are concerned that
this restriction might bias the analysis towards house-
holds with large stock portfolios, so we look at a
broader set of households that own stocks at the end
of a given year t and still hold risky assets at the
end of the following year. We extend the deﬁnition
of PGRh t and PLRh t to this broader set of in-
vestors. If the household does not experience a gain
during the year, we set PGRh t equal to the cross-
sectional mean for households with gains. Similarly
if the household does not experience a loss during the
year, weset PLRh t equalto thecross-sectionalmean
for households with losses.
II. Empirical Results
A. Unrestricted Regressions
In Table 1, we report the results of the pooled re-
gressions of each investment mistake on household
characteristics:
yh t j     
jxh t    h t j  1   j   3 
where all left-hand side and right-hand side variables
are demeaned. The vector xh t contains both ﬁnan-
cial and demographic characteristics. The ﬁrst cate-
gory includes disposable income, contributions to pri-
vate pension plans as a fraction of a three-year aver-
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real estate wealth, log of total liabilities, and dum-
mies for households that are retired, unemployed,
self-employed (“entrepreneurs”), and students. The
second category includes age, household size, and
dummies for households that have high-school edu-
cation, post-high-school education, or missing educa-
tion data (most common among older and immigrant
households) or are immigrants.
Financial wealth has a strikingly negative impact
on all three mistakes. Larger households with higher
educationmakesmallermistakes, whileentrepreneurs
are more prone to all mistakes. Other variables, such
as disposable income and real estate wealth, have a
less stable effect, but this appears to result from the
collinearity of the characteristics xh t  In the Appen-
dix, we compute the simple correlation between these
regressors and investment mistakes, and ﬁnd that in-
come and real estate wealth are negatively correlated
with all three mistakes.
Investment mistakes themselves are only weakly
correlated across households. The correlation be-
tween underdiversiﬁcation and risky share inertia is
15 5%, the correlation between underdiversiﬁcation
and the disposition effect measure is  10 7%, and the
correlation between risky share inertia and the dispo-
sition effect measure is 5 1%. When we consider in-
stead the ﬁtted values of the mistakes from Table 1,
the correlations are substantially higher, respectively
76 8%, 53 4%, and 80 9%. These ﬁndings suggest
that a single combination of household characteristics
can be used to explain suboptimal investment behav-
ior.
B. Index of Financial Sophistication
Weconstructanindexofﬁnancialsophisticationby
regressing the vector of ﬁnancial mistakes on a single
linear combination of household characteristics:
 yh t 1      xh t     h t 1 
 yh t 2    2   xh t     h t 2  (1)
 yh t 3    3   xh t     h t 3 
We interpret   xh t  as an index of ﬁnancial sophisti-
cation. Note that we have multiplied the mistake vec-
tor by  1 on the left-hand side, so that households
with a higher index tend to make lower mistakes. The
index is multiplied by proportionality constants  2
and  3 in the last two equations. The proportionality
constant is normalized to unity in the ﬁrst equation.
In Table 2, panel A, we report the results of the
nonlinear least squares estimation of   in (1). House-
holdswithhighﬁnancialwealth, educationandfamily
size achieve a high index of sophistication. In Table
2, panel B, we also report the proportionality coefﬁ-
cients  2 and  3  They are both positive, which con-
ﬁrms that the index is associated with a lower level of
all three mistakes. We observe that the proportional-
ity restriction causes only a slight loss in explanatory
power for underdiversiﬁcation and inertia, but a more
serious loss for the disposition effect compared to the
unrestricted regressions reported in Table 1.
The correlation between the sophistication index
and the risky share is equal to 0.35. This result con-
ﬁrms the ﬁnding in CCS (2007) that more sophis-
ticated agents tend to invest more aggressively and
make smaller mistakes.
C. Robustness Checks
In the online Appendix, we have veriﬁed the ro-
bustness of our results to alternative assumptions
about the household sample and the measurement of
ﬁnancialmistakes. First, weobtainsimilarresultsina
smaller subsample containing stockholders with both
gains and losses in their stock portfolios, as in Dhar
and Zhu (2006) and Odean (1998).
Second, we have considered several alternative
measure of inertia. Risky share changes yield broadly
similar, if slightly weaker, results in levels than in
logs. General equilibrium considerations imply that
changes in thetargetriskysharearepotentiallyimpor-
tant (CCS 2009). We have considered several proxies
for the target, and have found that our main results are
remarkably robust to these alternative measures.
Third, in the computation of the disposition ef-
fect, we have classiﬁed winners and losers according
to their absolute performance during the year, rather
than their performance relative to the world index.
Since absolute gains are relatively rare during the se-
vere bear market of our sample period, we conﬁne at-
tention to stockholders with both absolute gains and
losses in their stock portfolios, and obtain similar re-
sults. Our results are also robust to counting a gain
as realized only if the household fully disposes of the
corresponding stock during the year.
Finally, the household-level Sharpe ratios used in
Tables 1 and 2 are computed on the highly disaggre-
gated asset-level data provided by Statistics Sweden.
In other countries, however, researchers often have
access to more limited information on household ﬁ-
nances, and must typically rely on statistics such as4 PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY 2009
the number of stocks, the number of funds, and the
share of funds in the risky portfolio. In the Appendix,
we have investigated how these measures relate to the
Sharpe ratio. The share of funds in the risky portfolio
appears to be a reasonable diversiﬁcation proxy, with
a 0.49 cross-sectional correlation with the Sharpe ra-
tio. Furthermore, when we use this proxy in the re-
gression of ﬁnancial mistakes on characteristics, we
obtain results that are broadly consistent with the re-
sults obtained with the Sharpe ratio.1 This is encour-
aging since the share of funds in the risky portfolio is
readily available in a variety of datasets.
III. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we have conﬁrmed earlier evidence
that richer, educated households of larger size are less
prone to making ﬁnancial mistakes than other house-
holds. These results have motivated the construction
of a single index of ﬁnancial sophistication that best
explains a set of three investment mistakes. The in-
dex of ﬁnancial sophistication increases strongly with
ﬁnancial wealth and household size, and to a lesser
extent with education and proxies for ﬁnancial expe-
rience.
We have also reported a strong positive correla-
tion between a household’s sophistication index and
its share of risky assets. This correlation is consis-
tent with the intuition developed in CCS (2007) that
a household is willing to take ﬁnancial risk when it
is conﬁdent in its understanding of ﬁnancial markets
and the basic precepts of investing. In a recent and
related contribution, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales
(2007) emphasize the role of trust, both in oneself and
in others, as a key determinant of participation and
risk-taking. The detailed analysis of these closely re-
lated views of risk-taking is left open for further re-
search.
1Variables such as the number of stocks or the number
of funds, however, are poor diversiﬁcation proxies, as evi-
denced by their small or even slightly negative correlation
with the risky portfolio’s Sharpe ratio. We have also con-
sidered a more elaborate imputation method based on the
household’s number of stocks and funds, the share of funds
in the risky portfolio, as well as the average return, standard
deviation, and correlation of stocks and funds. This method
performs well but is only a very modest improvement over
the share of funds.
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